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Comments

Standing By to Protect Child Abuse
Victims: Utilizing Standby Counsel in
Lieu of Personal Cross-Examination
Claire Murtha*

ABSTRACT
Child abuse is a pervasive problem in the United States.
Often, the abused child’s word is the only evidence to prove the
abuse in court. For this reason, the child’s testimony is critical.
Testifying can pose a challenge for the abused child who must
face her abuser in the courtroom, especially if that abuser personally questions her.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the legitimate and strong interest the state has in protecting the psychological and physical well-being of children. When a child will face
significant trauma and cannot reasonably communicate in the
courtroom, the child can be questioned outside the presence of
the defendant through alternative contemporaneous methods
such as closed-circuit television (“CCTV”). Using closed-circuit
television implicates the right to confrontation, which guarantees
the opportunity for a defendant to confront his accuser. Despite
* J.D. Candidate, Penn State University Dickinson Law, 2022. Thank you to the
friends and family who supported me and helped make this comment what it is. I
am grateful for all of you.
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this guarantee, the court may limit the face-to-face exposure for
the child’s protection when the child would face a significant
level of trauma. Many states have codified the use of closed-circuit television in CCTV statutes. A court may also sua-sponte
impose limits on a self-represented defendant’s ability to personally question child witnesses. Such limits instead require standby
counsel to conduct the questioning, which courts have held does
not violate the right to self-representation.
This Comment explores the permissible limitations of the
right to confrontation and self-representation. Particularly, it
looks at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision Commonwealth v. Tighe and argues the court misclassified the above-mentioned rights. Based on the Fourth Circuit decision in Fields v.
Murray, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should have classified
these rights as distinct which would require different levels of necessity to limit. This Comment ultimately proposes a prohibition
against personal cross-examination by pro se defendants and the
passing of a pro se provision to the CCTV statute.
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INTRODUCTION

Child abuse is a pervasive problem in the United States with
approximately 678,000 instances each year.1 However, experts believe this number may be underreported.2 For most abused children, the abuse comes at an early age and from a parent.3 Abuse
occurs in many forms; 61 percent of children are neglected, 10 percent are physically abused, 7 percent are sexually abused, and
nearly 15 percent of children face 2 or more forms of abuse.4 On
average, about 21.4 percent of child abuse cases go to court in the
United States with around 100,000 children testifying each year.5
Children as young as three years old can testify.6 Some children can
benefit from the experience because testifying can provide closure
to children and allow a sense of control, but this is not true for
every child.7
1. National Statistics on Child Abuse, NAT’L CHILDREN’S ALLIANCE, (2019),
https://bit.ly/3mAcDkz [https://perma.cc/79DR-NNLE].
2. Id.
3. Id. The author recognizes children of any gender may be abused, however
for the sake of clarity only the female pronoun will be used when referring to child
victims.
4. Id.
5. Robert H. Pantell, The Child Witness in the Courtroom, 139 AM. ACAD.
PEDIATRICS 1, 1–2 (2017).
6. Barry Nurcombe, The Child as Witness: Competency and Credibility, 25 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRIST 473, 473 (1986).
7. L. Christine Bannon, The Trauma of Testifying in Court for Child Victims
of Sexual Assault v. the Accused’s Right to Confrontation, 18 L. & PSYCH. REV.
439, 441 (1994).
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Even though testifying can have some benefit to the child,
some suggest a child who testifies needs more protection, particularly protection from testifying in front of her abusers.8 A child witness’s added concern for confronting her abuser can increase any
negative feelings surrounding testifying such as stress, fear, or
dread.9 A frightened or nervous child will often struggle to answer
questions and may feel testifying has had an adverse effect.10 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized the possible adverse
effect on children who testify and that the state has an interest in
protecting them from such trauma.11
In addition to the protections available for witnesses, an individual charged with a criminal offense receives certain protections.12 The Sixth Amendment holds one of the greatest protections
for a criminal defendant.13 It states: “In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”14 This right is known as the Confrontation
Clause, or right to confrontation, and applies to both federal and
state criminal prosecutions.15 The Confrontation Clause has many
elements including the right to face-to-face confrontation and the
right to cross-examine statements by witnesses.16
History—dating as far back as the Roman period—recognizes
the right to face one’s accusers.17 This tradition protects against
communications or testimony without cross-examination by the de8. Id.
9. Id. at 441-42
10. Pantell, supra note 5 at 7.
11. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (recognizing there is
a significant state interest in protecting the psychological and emotional welfare of
children). See infra Section II.A & II.B (discussing the foundation and possible
limitations of the Confrontation Clause and the right to self-representation).
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X (protecting the right against self-incrimination); U.S. CONST. amend. XI (affording the right to a speedy trial and the right
to counsel).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, ET. AL., EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 383 (Wolters Kluwer, 9th
ed. 2019) (explaining the Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the ability
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, the ability to perceive the witness
and have the witness perceive the defendant, and the ability to protect against
hearsay).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42
(2004) (referring to part of the Sixth Amendment as “The Confrontation Clause”);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding the Sixth Amendment applies
to state and federal prosecutions).
16. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
17. Frank R. Herrmann, S.J. Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient
and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481, 482
(1994). The right to face one’s accuser is present in the Bible in the Acts of the
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fense and ensures the jury may observe witness testimony.18 By ensuring a defendant can cross-examine his accusers, the testimony
becomes more reliable, in part because the jury can observe witness
behavior and judge witness credibility.19
The Constitution provides another form of protection for criminal defendants—the right to self-representation, known as proceeding pro se.20 Proceeding pro se allows a defendant to put on his
own defense and control the manner of that defense.21 Self-representation cannot be used to abuse the court’s dignity or to ignore
relevant rules, but instead can be used to allow the defendant to
present what he believes to be his best possible defense.22 When a
defendant abuses the right, a judge may revoke it.23
These rights—to confrontation and self-representation—have
been challenged in cases where a child testifies against her alleged
abuser.24 Child abuse victims can have severe levels of trauma and
the presence of the abuser can exacerbate this trauma and inhibit
their ability to communicate.25 In response to this, the states have
created methods to protect children from further trauma in the
Apostles 25:16 and indicates that under Roman Law no man was to die without
meeting his accuser face-to-face and being given a chance to defend himself. Id.
18. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
19. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 848 (1990) (recognizing the Confrontation Clause guarantees the reliability of evidence, the key concern protected by
the hearsay doctrine). James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. UNIV. L.
REV. 903, 904 (2000) (“The trier of fact uses the witness’s demeanor to determine
the truth of the testimony.”). For the sake of clarity, the pronoun “he” will be used
when referring to defendants generally.
20. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814–15 (recognizing the Sixth
Amendment holds an implicit right to self-representation). For further discussion
about the right to self-representation, see infra Section II.B and accompanying
notes.
21. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 815.
22. Id. at 834.
23. Martinez v. Ct. of Appeal of California, Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 152,
161–62 (2000) (stating the right to self-representation is not absolute because the
government has an interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of trial, and the
judge may terminate self-representation as necessary).
24. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840–44 (1990) (challenging the
use of a closed-circuit television statute that restricted the child’s ability to see the
defendant as a violation of the Confrontation Clause and finding the statute constitutional and not a violation of the Confrontation Clause); Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d
1024, 1025–28 (4th Cir. 1994) (challenging the use of standby counsel to ask questions to the child witnesses instead of allowing the self-represented defendant to
ask the questions as a violation of the right to self-representation). The use of
standby counsel was not a violation of the right to self-representation. Id. at 1037.
25. See Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS FOR SOC’Y RSCH. CHILD
DEV. 1, 93 (1992) (finding younger children struggle to answer questions in court,
and a child’s feelings about the defendant affected her ability to answer questions).
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courtroom.26 Most notably, this includes using alternative contemporaneous methods by which the child can testify, such as closedcircuit television (“CCTV”), upon a showing of necessity.27 Testifying via CCTV protects a child from having to see her abuser in
court.28 Some judges appoint standby counsel to cross-examine the
child. Using standby counsel protects the child against potential
trauma stemming from being questioned directly by the defendant
during cross-examination.29 Procedural challenges arise in a case
with a pro se defendant when a child witness could testify via
closed-circuit television if the state does not have a pro se provision
in its statute.30 Courts may also struggle to balance the rights to
confrontation and self-representation against the protection of the
psychological wellbeing of children.31
This Comment will explore the right to confrontation found in
the Confrontation Clause and the implicit right to self-representation.32 It will address the use of closed-circuit television statutes and
examine Texas’ and Pennsylvania’s use of these statutes.33 Next, it
will overview the use of standby counsel, specifically in the context
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2020 case, Commonwealth v.
Tighe.34 This case arguably conflicts with other jurisprudence by
classifying the right to self-representation as equal to the right to
26. Pantell, supra note 5, at 2 (recognizing some states have a CCTV statute
allowing for testimony via CCTV and all states allow support people or comfort
objects and exclusion of the press).
27. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853–54. 24 states allow for one-way CCTV testimony:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and
Vermont. Id. at 854 n.3. Eight states allow two-way screening in which the child
can see the courtroom and the defendant: California, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota,
New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Vermont. Id at 854 n.3–4.
28. Id. at 835–54.
29. See, e.g., Fields, 49 F.3d at 1028 (ruling the defendant was not allowed to
ask the children the questions himself but instead could write the questions down
for the attorney to ask the child witnesses).
30. See Deborah Siri, Pro Se Defendants in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 22 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1088 (1989) (explaining the purpose of a CCTV statute is to
prevent emotional damage to the child but without a pro se provision that purpose
is frustrated). An accompanying pro se provision would give clear guidance on the
procedure for when a defendant appears pro se. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ART. 38.071 § 1 (1983).
31. See Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268, 1279 (“[I]f there is a parallel
between the limitation on the confrontation and self-representation rights . . . relevant evidence would presumably be required to justify those limitations in any
given case.”).
32. Infra Section II.A & II.B.
33. Infra Section II.C.
34. Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268 (Pa. 2020).
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confrontation for purposes of limiting personal cross-examination.35
This Comment will then explain the distinction between the rights
to confrontation and self-representation. Ultimately, it will conclude by suggesting Pennsylvania should create a prohibition on
personal cross-examination by pro se defendants and create a pro
se provision for its CCTV statute.36
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Confrontation Clause
1. The United States Constitution Guarantees a Right of
Confrontation to Criminal Defendants
The Confrontation Clause carries certain constitutional guarantees.37 It does the following:
Ensures that the witness will give his statements under oath . . .
Forces the witness to submit to cross-examination . . . [and] Permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the
demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the
jury in assessing his credibility.38

As part of these guarantees, the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Coy v. Iowa,39 the right to confrontation guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with a witness before the trier of
fact.40 In Coy, the Court explained that a proceeding in which a
screen was placed between the defendant and the witness was unconstitutional because it denied the defendant the opportunity for a
face-to-face confrontation.41
The right to confrontation guarantees the defendant the opportunity to show testimonial defects through cross-examination.42 The
Constitution gives a defendant the chance to demonstrate to the
fact-finder any reason to mistrust or give little weight to the wit35. Infra Section II.D.
36. Infra Section III.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a
speedy and public trial, trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the criminal
charges against the defendant, and the right to witnesses and to be represented by
a lawyer. Id.
38. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (allowing prior statements by witnesses to be used to does not violate the Confrontation Clause so long
as cross-examination is preserved).
39. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
40. Id. at 1016.
41. Id. at 1022.
42. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985).
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ness’s testimony.43 Face-to-face confrontation can expose such
infirmities.44
2. Limitations Upon the Right to Confrontation
Despite being at the core of the right to confrontation, face-toface confrontation is not an absolute right, and the United States
Supreme Court has never regarded it as such.45 In fact, the Court
expressly recognized face-to-face confrontation is not essential to
the right to confrontation.46 Instead, there exists a preference for
face-to-face confrontation, but important public policy can trump
such preference.47 Face-to-face confrontation is an element of confrontation, but it is not an indispensable element.48
When a child displays a certain level of trauma, such as serious
emotional distress, that is so strong the child cannot communicate
in the courtroom, a court may restrict a defendant’s right to confrontation in order to protect the child.49 A judge may restrict a
defendant’s right to confrontation when the state’s interest in the
wellbeing of child abuse victims outweighs the right to confrontation.50 However, to justify restricting a defendant’s right to face his
accusers in court, a prosecutor must demonstrate a case-specific
finding of necessity that the child would face more than de minimis
trauma brought on by the presence of the defendant, not merely the
courtroom itself.51
43. Id.
44. See infra Sections II.A.2 & II.C.1–2 and accompanying notes.
45. Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 22.
46. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“Although face-to-face
confrontation forms ‘the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause,’ [citation omitted] we have nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine
qua non of the confrontation right.”); see e.g., Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,
22 (1985) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is
given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose [testimonial] infirmities
through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the
reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’s testimony.”).
47. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (declining to decide explicitly
what exceptions exist to the face-to-face requirement but stating such exceptions
“would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important policy”);
Craig, 497 U.S. at 849 (recognizing the preference for face-to-face confrontation
must give way to important public policy considerations).
48. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849.
49. See id. at 860 (holding the use of CCTV was constitutional because the
child would be traumatized by the presence of the defendant).
50. Id. at 853.
51. Id. at 855–56 (recognizing de minimis trauma as “ ‘mere nervousness or
excitement or some reluctance to testify’ ”) (quoting Wildermuth v. Maryland, 530
A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987).
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B. The Right to Self-Representation
1. Faretta v. California and the Right to Proceed Pro Se
The Sixth Amendment implicitly contains the right to represent oneself in a criminal action, known as proceeding pro se.52
The Sixth Amendment states an accused may “have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.”53 This statement, known as the Counsel
Clause, includes the implied right to conduct one’s own defense
without the assistance of counsel, thus forming the right to self-representation.54 The right to self-representation means a defendant
must be allowed to control his own defense, including presenting
motions, arguing law, conducting voir dire and witness examination,
and addressing the jury and judge.55 Such protection affirms the defendant’s dignity and autonomy.56
In Faretta v. California,57 a criminal defendant desired to put
forth his own defense, but the state of California “force[d] a lawyer
upon him.”58 The United States Supreme Court had to decide
whether the Constitution guaranteed defendants a right to self-representation in a criminal proceeding and whether a state could require a pro se defendant to have standby counsel.59 In deciding, the
Court looked to state constitutions, the Judicial Act of 178960, English Common Law, and United States Court of Appeals decisions.61 The Court explained that the trial court violated the right to
proceed pro se by requiring standby counsel for the defendant despite the defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to
counsel.62 The Faretta holding gives an accused criminal defendant
the implicit right to represent himself provided he knowingly and
52. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 170 (1984) (referring to self-represented defendants as pro se).
53. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 178.
57. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
58. Id. at 807–09.
59. Id. at 807. Standby counsel may be appointed to assist a pro se defendant.
See, e.g., Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, n.3 (9th Cir. 1983) (“ ‘Standby’ counsel
refers to the situation in which a pro se defendant is given the assistance of advisory counsel who may take over the defense if for some reason the defendant
becomes unable to continue.”).
60. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92. The First Congress passed the act and
President Washington signed it “one day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed, provided that ‘in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead
and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of . . . counsel . . . .’
The right is currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812–13.
61. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816.
62. Id. at 835.
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intelligently waives the right to counsel and agrees to abide by
courtroom procedure.63
In its analysis, the Faretta Court looked to Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann,64 which recognized that the right to counsel
holds an implicit right to dispense with counsel’s assistance.65 By
forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant, the Court found the
State in fact violated the defendant’s right to present his own
defense.66
2. Clarifying the Self-Representation Right
In McKaskle v. Wiggins67, the Supreme Court clarified the selfrepresentation right as presented in Faretta.68 Wiggins was proceeding pro se in a state robbery trial and the trial court appointed
standby counsel.69 Wiggins argued the presence of his standby
counsel’s assistance violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.70 Despite the self-representation right as put forth in
Faretta, there exists no absolute bar against unsolicited participation of standby counsel.71 Supporting this contention, the McKaskle
Court relied on a footnote in Faretta stating a judge can appoint
standby counsel to aid the defendant over the defendant’s
objection.72
To evaluate whether standby counsel’s involvement has violated a defendant’s right to self-representation, the court must ask
“whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his
own way.”73 Unsolicited and excessive intrusion by standby counsel
undermines the opportunity for a defendant to conduct his own defense.74 Additionally, any use of standby counsel should not change
the jury’s perception of a defendant’s pro se status and must be
63. See id. at 835–36 (holding an accused must knowingly and intelligently
waive the benefits of council and follow the “ground rules” of trial and courtroom
procedure).
64. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
65. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 269).
66. Id. at 835.
67. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
68. Id. at 170–71. Wiggins appealed arguing the presence of standby counsel
violated his right to present his own defense. Id. at 170–73.
69. Id. at 170.
70. Id. at 170–74.
71. Id. at 176.
72. Faretta, 422 U.S. at n.46 (referencing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1124–26 (D.C. Cir.)).
73. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177.
74. Id.
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conducted in a manner to preserve that viewpoint.75 However, a
court’s appointment of standby counsel to overcome procedural
challenges does not violate the self-representation right.76 Ultimately, McKaskle held a judge can appoint standby counsel to promote procedural efficiency and explain courtroom protocol.77
C. The Use of Closed-Circuit Television
1. The Use of Closed-Circuit Television Generally
Recognizing the challenge of a child testifying in front of her
alleged abuser, 24 states have created statutes that allow a child to
testify via CCTV when the prosecutor demonstrates the child
would be significantly traumatized by testifying in front of the defendant.78 Maryland v. Craig79 was the seminal case authorizing the
use of this one-way CCTV practice.80 Craig concerned a Maryland
statute authorizing the use of one-way CCTV to conduct testimony
by child victims when a judge finds a child would face severe emotional distress that would render the child unable to reasonably
communicate in court.81 The defendant was charged with child
abuse and several sex offenses, and he challenged the use of the
75. Id. at 178. Jury perception is an important part of the self-representation
right because if the jury does not understand the defendant is representing himself
it may erode the dignity value that self-representation promotes and it can undercut the defendant’s presentation of his defense. Id. Despite these risks, standby
counsel involvement does not need to take place outside the presence of the jury
so long as it does not erode the perception of the defendant conducting his own
defense. Id. at 181–82.
76. Id. at 183. Common procedural challenges standby counsel may assist in
include evidentiary issues, such as introducing exhibits and objecting to testimony.
Id.
77. Id. at 184.
78. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853–54, (1990). The following states allow one-way CCTV testimony: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and Vermont. Id. at n.3. Eight states allow two-way
screening in which the child can see the courtroom and the defendant: California,
Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Vermont. Id at n.3–4.
79. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
80. Nat’l Ctr. for Prosecution of Child Abuse, Closed-Circuit Television Statutes, NAT’L DISTRICT ATTY’S ASSOC. 1, 1 (Aug. 2012) https://bit.ly/3bqIIs1 [https://
perma.cc/7AHT-C29X]. One-way CCTV allows only one party to be seen. Id.
When used for child testimony, one-way CCTV is used so the courtroom can see
the feed from the room when the child is, but the child is unable to see the courtroom and most importantly the defendant. Id.
81. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840. The Maryland statute expressly allows for children
to testify via closed-circuit television when the child would feel such emotional
distress that reasonable communication is not possible. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM
PROC § 11-303 (2001).
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Maryland CCTV statute for a six-year-old girl.82 A CCTV statute
allows a child to testify in a room with only the prosecutor and defense counsel; the testimony is broadcast to the courtroom where
the defendant, jury, and judge observe the questioning through
one-way CCTV broadcast.83
In Craig, the Court evaluated the Maryland statute to determine if it infringed upon the defendant’s right to confrontation.84
The Court held the Maryland Statute was constitutional because
the state’s interest in the wellbeing of children was sufficient to outweigh the defendant’s right to confront his accuser.85 The Court expressed there are more considerations beyond the preference for
face-to-face confrontation; preference for face-to-face confrontation can give way to important public policy such as protecting children.86 However, to limit this right, the prosecutor must
demonstrate a showing of case-specific necessity.87
2. State Use of CCTV—Texas and Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has a CCTV statute entitled Testimony by Contemporaneous Alternative Means,88 which allows testimony by
CCTV and other contemporaneous methods.89 This statute allows a
child to testify outside the courtroom when the presence of the defendant would cause the child to suffer “serious emotional distress
that would substantially impair the child victim’s or child material
witness’s ability to reasonably communicate.”90
In Commonwealth v. Williams,91 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court evaluated the use of the CCTV statute during a preliminary
82. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840.
83. Id. at 841.
84. Id. at 843 (citing to Maryland statute).
85. Id. at 860.
86. Id. at 863.
87. Id. at 587–88. Case-specific necessity requires the state to demonstrate a
need for each individual child rather than a general rule allowing it for all children.
Id. at 857–58.
88. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5985 (2004).
89. Id. A scenarios when a child has testified outside the presence was a rape
trial in which the psychotherapist testified the victim had significant mental health
problems including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and suicidal
thoughts and that if the victim were to testify in front of the defendant she would
enter an “emotional tailspin.” Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 559 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2006). When a child only feels the mild trauma, anxiety, and fear that
would ordinarily occur with witness testimony, then the threshold has not been
met to invoke the statute. See Commonwealth v. Louden, 638 A.2d 953, 955 (Pa.
1994) (stating subjective fear of a witness, without more, is insufficient grounds to
restrict face-to-face confrontation).
90. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5985(a)–(a.1) (2004).
91. Commonwealth v. Williams, 84 A.3d 680 (Pa. 2014).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-1\DIK108.txt

2021]

STANDING BY

TO

unknown

Seq: 13

25-OCT-21

PROTECT CHILD ABUSE VICTIMS

12:33

261

hearing.92 The court determined the statute was not contrary to the
Pennsylvania nor the United States Constitution because defense
counsel still had the opportunity to cross-examine, and the defendant and fact-finder could observe the child’s demeanor.93 The
court noted the statute requires a proper showing of necessity by
the prosecution and still preserves the other important aspects of
the Confrontation Clause such as testifying under oath, full and
complete cross-examination, and the opportunity to be observed by
the factfinder.94 The Pennsylvania statute does not contain a provision addressing the procedure for pro se defendants when a child is
allowed to testify via CCTV.95
Texas, like Pennsylvania and several other states, has a statute
authorizing the use of alternative testimony methods for children
who cannot testify in the presence of the defendant.96 The Texas
statute differs from the Pennsylvania statute by explicitly requiring
the court to appoint standby counsel for pro se defendants.97
Standby counsel’s involvement only extends to the CCTV testimony and the defendant may conduct his defense and communicate
with the standby counsel during the questioning.98 The explicit pro
se provision removes any doubt as to the procedure where there is a
pro se defendant.99
D. The Use of Standby Counsel
Standby counsel can act as another procedural option to assist
a pro se defendant and represent him upon any termination of selfrepresentation, even against the protest of the defendant.100 The
92. Id. at 681–82.
93. Id. at 684.
94. Id. at 689.
95. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5985 (2004) (containing no provisions relating to
pro se defendants).
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 38.071 § 1 (1983). Courts have held the
provision for recorded testimony is unconstitutional. Powell v. State, 765 S.W.2d
435, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding the provision for pre-recorded testimony
as unconstitutional because it did not comply with the Confrontation Clause).
However, courts have not taken issue with the standby counsel provision. See, e.g.,
Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding unconstitutional the use videotaped interviews of a child responding to interrogatories and
holding the Confrontation Clause requires live testimony).
97. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 38.071 § 11.
98. Id.
99. Siri, supra note 30.
100. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1974) (“Of course, a
State may—even over objection by the accused—appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to
aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s self-representation is necessary.”) (citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124–26
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American Bar Association Project for Criminal Justice suggests
“standby counsel should always be appointed in cases expected to
be long or complicated or in which there are multiple defendants.”101 As discussed earlier, the use of standby counsel does not
violate a defendant’s right to self-representation so long as the defendant can retain control over the presentation of his defense, and
the jury understands the defendant is conducting his own trial.102
In Fields v. Murray,103 the Fourth Circuit decided whether
prohibiting a pro se defendant from personally cross-examining witnesses violated the right to self-representation and the right to confrontation.104 During trial the prosecution did not have to prove an
individualized showing of trauma to limit the defendant from questioning the girls because of the state’s strong interest in protecting
the child’s wellbeing.105 Fields held personal cross-examination is
but one element of the right to self-representation, which can be
limited by a judge to further a compelling state interest.106 The
court explained that emotional trauma is easy to assume when the
defendant would personally cross-examine the child.107 The court
further suggested the state’s interest in protecting children from
personal confrontation may be stronger than the interest implicated
in Craig of protecting a child from testifying in her abuser’s presence.108 Further, the ability to conduct personal cross-examination
is less fundamental than the right to confrontation, according to the
court.109
(D.C. Cir. 1972)). Self-representation may be terminated due to disruptive behavior. U.S. v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir 1972).
101. See Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, Recommended
by the Advisory Committee on the Judge’s Function, AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT FOR
CRIM. JUST., § 6.7 (Tentative Draft of April 21, 1972, as approved by the House of
Delegates, July 1971).
102. Supra Section II.B.
103. Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024 (4th Cir. 1995).
104. Id. at 1025.
105. See id. at 1037 (reasoning it was not essential to provide evidence to the
girl’s probable emotional harm resulting from being questioned by the defendant
to limit the defendant from doing so).
106. Id. at 1035.
107. Id. at 1036.
108. Id.
109. Id. The dissent states the majority has collapsed the distinction between
the right to self-representation and confrontation by applying the Craig framework
to the present issue. Id. at 1045 (Ervin, J., dissenting). Despite this characterization
that the majority fails to distinguish the rights, the majority does recognize the
distinction by stating “the right denied here, that of cross-examining witnesses personally, lacks the fundamental importance of the right denied in Craig, that of
confronting adverse witnesses face-to-face.” Id. at 1036–37. Personal cross-examination is but one aspect of self-representation and if it lacks the “fundamental
importance” of confrontation, then the rights to self-representation and confronta-
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1. Pennsylvania’s Use of Standby Counsel—Commonwealth v.
Tighe
Pennsylvania allows the use of standby counsel when a defendant proceeds pro se.110 In Commonwealth v. Tighe,111 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up the issue of standby counsel for
cross-examination in child abuse cases. In Tighe, the defendant was
accused of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl.112 The defendant’s
bail included a no-contact order prohibiting him from contacting
the girl which he violated with a telephone call.113 At trial, the
judge appointed standby counsel despite the defendant’s wish to
proceed pro se.114 The victim was to testify, and the Commonwealth
argued in a motion that Tighe ought to be prohibited from questioning the girl personally because of the no-contact order violation.115 In support of its motion, the Commonwealth offered
evidence that the girl was frightened by the defendant’s contact.116
The trial court granted this motion and prohibited Tighe from directly questioning the girl.117 Instead, the judge permitted him to
write down questions and ask them through either his standby
counsel or the judge.118
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
ruling, explaining that because the defendant retained control of his
defense there was no detriment in preventing the defendant from
personally cross-examining the victim.119 The opinion treats the
right to self-representation and confrontation as nearly equivalent;
tion are fundamentally distinct. Fields 49 F.3d at 1035. Despite using Craig’s framework for limiting the right to confrontation, the court does find the rights are
distinct. Id. at 1035–37.
110. PA. R. CRIM. P. 121(d).
111. Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268, 1268 (Pa. 2020). No other Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions touch upon this issue as of the time of publication. Kevin McKeon & Dennis Whitaker, Commonwealth v. Tighe (Allocatur
Grant), PA. APP. ADVOC. (last visited Mar. 6, 2021) https://bit.ly/3eenkrz (“The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to review a matter of first impression decided by Superior Court.”).
112. Tighe, 224 A.3d at 1269.
113. Id. at 1270.
114. See id. at 1269 (appointing counsel pursuant to rule PA. R. CRIM. P.
121(d)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1282 (affirming the lower court, which relied on Fields and held
when there is an important state interest personal cross-examination can be restricted). The Superior Court was not persuaded that the defendant’s right to selfrepresentation was infringed because he retained control over his defense. Commonwealth v. Tighe, 184 A.3d 560, 570 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). The Superior Court
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the court states that if there exists a parallel between the two rights,
then a similar showing of necessity would be required in each instance.120 The lower court did not inquire into the level of trauma
the child would face by the defendant conducting the questioning,
so the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to decide expressly if
the limitation on confrontation has a “parallel paradigm” within the
right to self-representation.121 The court declined to offer what
level of necessity would be required for a court to limit self-representation but suggested that limiting self-representation would require the same level of necessity as to limit the right to
confrontation.122 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the
lower court’s decision on the narrow grounds that the right to selfrepresentation is limited in nature, and Tighe forfeited his right to
self-representation through his violation of the no-contact order
outside of court.123 The court declined to define the bounds of
standby counsel and child victim testimony.124
III.

ANALYSIS

A. The Right to Self-Representation and the Right to
Confrontation Are Distinct
In interpreting the rights to self-representation and confrontation, states have taken two approaches.125 The majority approach
views the two rights as distinct and require different levels of necessity to limit self-representation or face-to-face confrontation.126 Alternatively, the minority approach views the rights as requiring the
same showing of necessity for limiting face-to-face confrontation
agreed with Fields that when confrontation can be limited based on trauma, so
may personal cross-examination. Id. at 568.
120. Tighe, 224 A.3d at 1279.
121. Id. (“We are hesitant to determine whether the permissible limitation on
the confrontation right as it applies to child victims of sexual abuse, see Craig, has
a parallel paradigm applicable to the self-representation right.”).
122. See id. (suggesting limiting personal cross-examination, would require a
level of severe emotional distress). “If there is a parallel between the limitation on
the confrontation and self-representation rights . . . relevant evidence would presumably be required to justify those limitations in any given case.” Id.
123. Id. at 1280–82.
124. See id. at 1279 (“Accordingly, this case is a poor vehicle to decide [the
parallel between limitations on confrontation and self-representation], as there
simply was no evidentiary showing with respect to [the victim’s] emotional response to direct questioning by appellant.”).
125. Tyler D. Carlton, Comment, A Balancing Act: Providing the Proper Balance Between a Child Sexual Abuse Victim’s Rights and the Right to Personal
Cross-Examination in Arizona, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1453, 1461–64 (2017).
126. Id. at 1461–62.
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and personal cross-examination.127 The Fourth Circuit’s Fields decision creates one basis for the majority viewpoint; it classifies an intrusion on the right to self-representation through standby counsel
as a lesser intrusion than an imposition on the right to confrontation.128 Supreme Court jurisprudence supports this, recognizing the
right to confrontation may be limited after demonstrating a high
level of necessity, but the right to self-representation may be limited by a need for procedural efficiency.129 Jurisdictions that use the
majority approach require less evidence when restricting personal
cross-examination because limiting personal cross-examination is
viewed as less intrusive on Sixth Amendment rights than limiting
face-to-face confrontation.130
The right to confrontation and self-representation have different rationales.131 The right to confrontation ensures the reliability
of evidence through cross-examination.132 Conversely, the right to
self-representation is implicit in the right to counsel and promotes
individual choice and dignity.133 The right to self-representation
does not affect the reliability of evidence nor a fair trial, unlike the
right to confrontation.134
Courts should treat the rights to self-representation and confrontation as distinct.135 The right to personal cross-examination
“lack[s] the fundamental importance of the right . . . of confronting
adverse witnesses face-to-face.”136 As such, a lower level of neces127. See id. at 1463 (indicating that only Arizona and Idaho apply the minority approach).
128. Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1035 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fields court
makes clear that while the right to confrontation is explicitly in the Sixth Amendment, self-representation is only an implicit right and is therefore not absolute. Id.
129. Compare Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (stating there must be a high level of
necessity to limit the Confrontation Clause), with McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 184 (1984) (recognizing self-representation may be limited for procedural
efficiency).
130. Carlton, supra note 125. States using this philosophy include Kentucky,
Michigan, Washington, and Massachusetts. Id.
131. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (recognizing the “ultimate goal” of the Confrontation Clause is to protect the reliability of evidence),
with McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176–78 (stating the right to self-representation is to
promote individual dignity).
132. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
133. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176–78.
134. See id. at 176–77 (reasoning the right to appear pro se exists to affirm the
dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, at
least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible defense).
135. See Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1035 (4th Cir. 1995) (classifying the
rights as distinct).
136. Id. at 1035–36.
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sity ought to be required when a lower level of intrusion occurs.137
Any infringement on a defendant’s ability to personally cross-examine a victim destroys neither a defendant’s control over his own
case nor the perception of the jury that he is proceeding pro se.138
1. Tighe Inconsistently Classified the Self-Representation and
Confrontation Rights with Fields
The Tighe decision, despite relying on Fields, which classifies
the right to self-representation and confrontation as distinct,139 alludes to the idea that these rights require the same level of necessity
for restriction.140 The Tighe court reasoned that if there exists any
similarity between the self-representation and confrontation rights,
then limiting self-representation would require the same evidence
as limiting confrontation.141 This analysis fails to account for the
difference in the rights.142 While not central to the holding, the suggestion that the confrontation and self-representation rights are
identical is arguably inconsistent with Fields.143
Fields made clear the rights are distinct because limiting personal cross-examination is less intrusive than limiting face-to-face
confrontation.144 A lesser intrusion warrants a lesser level of necessity to limit that right; thus, a restriction of personal cross-examination should require a lesser showing of necessity than a restriction
of face-to-face confrontation.145 Because it relied on Fields, the
Tighe court ought to have made the distinction between the right to
self-representation and confrontation but failed to do so.146 Other
courts that rely upon Fields distinguish between the right to self137. See id. (stating the self-representation right can still be preserved with
the use of standby counsel and that the state interest in protecting children from
personal cross-examination is just as important if not more important than protecting children from face-to-face contact like in Craig).
138. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178.
139. See supra Section II.D & III.A (regarding Fields’ treatment of the rights
and Tighe’s reliance on the Fields decision).
140. See Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268, 1279 (Pa. 2020) (noting if
there is a parallel between the confrontation and self-representation rights then
relevant evidence would be needed to limit self-representation as there is for confrontation, but the court declined to decide the matter explicitly).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1280.
143. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036 (stating personal cross-examination “lacks the
fundamental importance of the [confrontation] right.”).
144. Id. at 1037.
145. See id. at 1036–37 (reasoning significant evidence was not required to
limit the defendant from personally cross-examining the child victims because it is
not difficult to imagine the resulting trauma). While requiring a lesser degree of
emotional trauma, the court still used a Craig analysis. Id. at 1035.
146. See Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268, 1279 (Pa 2020).
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representation and confrontation and require the state to show different levels of necessity when trying to limit confrontation or personal cross-examination.147 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
misinterpreted Fields by suggesting that to limit self-representation
would require the state to show al level of necessity equal to that
which is required to limit confrontation.148
B. The Prohibition of Personal Cross-Examination Protects Both
the Right to Confrontation and the Right to SelfRepresentation
A criminal defendant has a right to confront his accusers and
represent himself if he so chooses, but the state also has an interest
in protecting the psychological and physical wellbeing of children.149 As discussed above, a child can be traumatized by facing
her abuser in court and even more so if questioned directly by her
abuser.150 A prohibition of personal cross-examination would protect the right to confrontation and self-representation and also allow the state to protect children.151 Courts have recognized that
standby counsel questioning a child witness does not violate the
right to self-representation.152 Fields made clear the compelling
need to protect a child from being personally questioned by her
alleged abuser and held there does not need to be as high a showing
of emotional trauma to limit self-representation as there needs to
be to limit confrontation.153 The Fields court did not say there
needs to be any individual showing of trauma and instead spoke
broadly about what can be assumed of any child victim-witness:
It is far less difficult to conclude that a child sexual abuse victim
will be emotionally harmed by being personally cross-examined
147. Carlton, supra note 125.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (stating the right to an
attorney carries an implicit right to represent one’s self); Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (discussing the state’s interest in the physical and psychological wellbeing of children as significant enough to outweigh the Confrontation
Clause in some instances).
150. See supra Section I and accompanying notes.
151. See Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1034 (4th. Cir. 1995) (stating that
restricting a defendant’s right to confrontation by preventing personal cross-examination and face-to-face confrontation still meets the purpose of the Confrontation
Clause when it is necessary to further an important public policy).
152. Id. at 1037.
153. Id. at 1036–37 (recognizing limiting self-representation does not hold the
same importance as limiting Confrontation and that it is not necessary to show
particular evidence that the children would be traumatized by being questioned by
the defendant directly).
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by her alleged abuser than by being required merely to testify in
his presence. Further, the right denied here, that of cross-examining witnesses personally, lacks the fundamental importance of
the right denied in Craig, that of confronting adverse witnesses
face-to-face. As a result, we do not believe it was essential in this
case that psychological evidence of the probable emotional harm
to each of the girls be presented in order for the trial court to find
that denying Fields personal cross examination was necessary to
protect them.154

Because personal cross-examination carries a clear risk of
trauma for an abused child, there should be no need for an elaborate showing of necessity as with limiting confrontation.155 Prohibiting pro se defendants from personally questioning child witnesses
still fulfills the promises of confrontation and self-representation
rights.156 When standby counsel cross-examines a child, the defendant can still control the questioning by giving the attorney the
cross-examination questions, ensuring a defendant’s ability to both
confront his accuser and control his own defense.157 Witness examination is only one piece of a trial, and any concerns over jury perception regarding the defendant conducting his own case will be
mitigated by the defendant controlling the rest of his own defense
because standby counsel will not be present if only used for the
victim cross-examination.158
1. Proposed Solution: Pennsylvania Should Create a Categorical
Prohibition Against Child Abuse Defendants Personally
Questioning Victims
To address the state’s interest in protecting the psychological
wellbeing of children and the right to confrontation and self-representation, Pennsylvania should create a prohibition on pro se defendants’ questioning of child witnesses. In Tighe, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court miscategorized the right to self-representation and
confrontation as requiring the same showing of emotional trauma
necessary to limit the right. This holding is inconsistent with
154. Id.
155. See id. (classifying the intrusion on self-representation as lacking the fundamental importance of denying the right to face-to-face confrontation).
156. See id. at 1034 (reasoning face-to-face confrontation is but one element
of the right to confrontation and that the right can be satisfied with this element).
157. See id. at 1035 (stating while Fields’ ability to present his chosen defense
may have been reduced slightly by not being allowed personally to cross-examine
the girls, it would have been otherwise assured because he could still control his
defense, including the questions asked during cross-examination).
158. Id.
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Fields.159 Fields makes clear the two rights are distinct and that the
state has a far higher interest in protecting children from personal
cross-examination.160 As such, the state should protect that interest
by making an absolute prohibition in all child abuse proceedings
against pro se defendants personally questioning child victim-witnesses.161 Such a rule would not only protect the children who may
have severe trauma but also any other children who would be negatively impacted by this experience.162 A categorical prohibition
would remove any judicial uncertainty or unequal treatment, as
well as protect the child’s wellbeing while still accomplishing the
goals of both self-representation and confrontation.163
C. The Purpose of a CCTV Testimony Statute is Best Fulfilled
with an Accompanying Standby Counsel Provision
Prohibiting personal cross-examination is not the only way to
protect children in abuse cases; CCTV testimony statutes also protect a child from facing her alleged abuser.164 When a child testifies
via CCTV, the child is questioned in a separate room with only the
prosecutor, defense attorney, and appropriate technical staff present.165 But when a defendant is pro se, the only person to question
the child is the defendant himself.166 The purpose of a CCTV statute is to protect children from emotional trauma upon facing an
alleged abuser.167 But without a provision for the occurrence of a
pro se defendant, any use of the statute would be futile.

159. See supra Section III.A. (detailing the difference between the right to
self-representation and confrontation).
160. Fields, 49 F.3d at 1036–37.
161. See id. (making clear the need to protect child abuse victims and the lack
of an intrusion on any self-representation or confrontation right by requiring the
use of standby counsel).
162. Id.
163. See id. at 1034–35 (stating the goals of self-representation and the Confrontation Clause are met when standby counsel is used instead of personal crossexamination).
164. Supra section II.C.
165. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990).
166. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975) (proceeding pro se is
dispensing with a lawyer’s help).
167. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840 (recognizing the purpose of a CCTV statute is to
protect a child from facing her alleged abuser).
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1. Proposed Solution: Pennsylvania Should Enact a CCTV
Statute Provision Mirroring Texas’ to Require Standby
Counsel for Pro Se Defendants
As discussed above, Texas has a provision in its CCTV statute
that expressly appoints standby counsel for a pro se defendant,
which protects the purpose of the statute.168 Pennsylvania should
enact a similar statute to Texas to better fulfill the purpose of the
CCTV statute.169 Such a provision would ensure (1) that a child
does not have to face her alleged abuser and (2) there is a uniform
procedure.170 The Pennsylvania CCTV statute states that the defendant shall not be present with the child, but it does not give guidance for a case involving a pro se defendant.171 Instead, standby
counsel should be appointed for the CCTV questioning only and
given means to communicate with the defendant in the courtroom
so the defendant could can still control his own questioning.172 The
statute should read as follows:
In a proceeding under § 5985 (a) in which a child is questioned
via an alternative contemporaneous method and the defendant is
without an attorney, the court shall appoint counsel to represent
the defendant at the proceeding for the purposes of the child’s
cross-examination.173

This proposed statutory language would guarantee that in a
case with a pro se defendant, if necessary, a child could testify via
CCTV without having to face her alleged abuser.174 It would also
ensure the defendant could cross-examine the child through a communication method between the attorney in the room and the defendant, such as text messaging.175 The proposed statute preserves
the right to self-representation because the standby counsel would
168. Supra section II.C.2.
169. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5985 (2004) (lacking a provision for pro se
defendants).
170. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 840 (recognizing the purpose of a CCTV statute is
to protect a child from facing her alleged abuser).
171. 42 PA. CONS. STAT § 5985(a.2) (2004).
172. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (h) (2012) (requiring the judge and defendant to be able to communicate with the attorneys in the room at all times via
electronic method).
173. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 38.071 § 1 (1983) (modeling language
after Texas Rule of Criminal Procedure 38.071 § 1).
174. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 38.071 § 11.
175. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM PROC § 11-303(d)(3)(2001) (requiring
the defendant to be able to communicate with those in the room via electronic
method).
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only be used for cross-examination of the child witness.176 It would
similarly protect the goal of a CCTV statute in preventing a child
from being forced to be in a room with her abuser.177 Finally, it
satisfies the right to confrontation because with the proper communication the defendant would still have a full opportunity to crossexamine.178 Additionally, a jury instruction should be given so as
not to destroy the perception of a defendant conducting his own
defense.179 This jury instruction would instruct the jury to not let
the presence of standby counsel undermine the defendant’s pro se
status and remind the jury that the defendant is self-represented180
IV.

CONCLUSION

The state has a clear interest in protecting children from emotional trauma.181 Protection can take the form of using CCTV for
the child’s testimony or using standby counsel to cross-examine the
child on behalf of the pro se defendant.182 These options can prevent a child from being retraumatized by the presence of the defendant, which could render the child unable to communicate.183 Every
criminal defendant has certain constitutional rights, and understandably the propositions outlined above can raise some concerns
for the rights of a defendant.184 Despite any concerns of the rights
to self-representation or confrontation which must be protected to
have a fair trial, the limited use of standby counsel does not violate
176. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268, 1281-82 (Pa. 2020)
(finding no constitutional violation when standby counsel was used for cross-examination of a child victim-witness).
177. Siri, supra note 30.
178. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM PROC § 11-303(d)(3)(2001) (requiring communication between the attorney in the room and the defendant would allow a
defendant to be texting, for example, questions to the attorney to ask during the
cross-examination because it is a live transmission).
179. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984).
180. Such a jury instruction could read: Members of the Jury you are not to
consider the presence of the standby counsel during any part of the trial to negate
the fact that the defendant has elected to present his own defense. The defendant
has a right to conduct his own defense, and the presence of standby counsel is not
to negate that right. No inference of guilt or incompetency is to be drawn from the
presence of the standby counsel.
181. See generally, supra section II.
182. Supra section II.
183. Supra section I & II.
184. See Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1047 (4th Cir. 1995) (Ervin, J., dissenting) (arguing while concern for children can bring about some modification of
constitutional rights, the right to self-representation “is particularly important, not
only to the defendant who is denied his right to defend himself . . . but also to our
system of justice . . . which is made less fair by telling some defendants that they
may not serve as their own defense.”).
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those rights. A defendant can still represent himself in a trial even
with standby counsel cross-examining a child victim. With proper
communication and preparation, the defendant will have as equal
an opportunity to cross-examine as he would if he were personally
cross-examining.185 By limiting the standby counsel’s participation
to only the cross-examination of the child victim and allowing the
defendant to control the questioning, this narrowly tailored provision achieves a specific goal of protecting the emotional wellbeing
of child abuse victims.
In Pennsylvania, the state legislature can better fulfill the goals
of its CCTV statute by passing a pro se provision to ensure clarity
and uniformity.186 Additionally, despite making a proper ruling in
Tighe by prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining the child
victim-witnesses, the court should have gone further in its analysis.187 The Tighe court should have recognized the distinction between the right to self-representation and confrontation as the
Fourth Circuit did in Fields.188 This distinction allows the limitation
of self-representation through the use of standby counsel while not
infringing on confrontation.189 Suggesting a categorical prohibition
on personal cross-examination of a child witness by a pro se defendant is a strong recommendation that comes with obvious concerns
for the defendant’s rights. However, it is the only way to ensure a
child never has to feel the terror of confronting her abuser directly.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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